YOP SECRET SUELE

28 May 52

1.

FAR EAST

2. Chinese forces in Korea to increase offensive capabilities:

Chinese Communist
Military
18 May 52
SUEDE

K-3054
complished by 15 July.
year's floods."

An intercepted message of 18 May on a Chinese Communist military network in Korea reveals that "all volunteer units" have been ordered to store supplies to last through 15 September. This must be ac-The order is attributed to "experience of last

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TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 22-Mar-2010

YOP SECRET SUELE

Comment: Other recent messages received from Korea show that several Chinese units in the forward area have already accumulated heavy stocks of petroleum and ammunition. A general supply build-up in the forward area, if achieved, would increase the capability for an offensive of major proportions.

27 May 52	that the enemy has a total of 1,115 aircraft	·
	massed in Manchuria and that this overwhelm- ing superiority gives him a major offensive	
	e bases of UN F-86's, as well as the headquarters	
	d air forces in Korea, are well within the combat and 35 piston fighters based at Antung, Tatungkou,	
Takushan and Sinuiju.	Only a few miles farther inland on the Anshan-	
	light bombers, 240 jet ⁵ and 85 piston fighters are support as well as additional shock power for a	
fensive without warni airfields, would quite from the initial attack	Although there are no indications of an im- the Communists have sufficient air facilities and logistic support to launch an of- ng in which UN planes, crowded on Kimpo and Suwon possibly sustain more than 50 percent destruction c. Such losses would necessitate forfeiture of offen- ty in favor of defense tactics.	
aircraft, personnel, fensive without warni airfields, would quite from the initial attack	the Communists have sufficient air facilities and logistic support to launch an of- ng in which UN planes, crowded on Kimpo and Suwon possibly sustain more than 50 percent destruction c. Such losses would necessitate forfeiture of offen-	/N
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